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THE WATER FINANCE
AUTHORITY
An Evaluation
by Mark D. Rasch and Frank Butterini
Editor'snote: The Water FinanceAuthority proposal was sent
to the N.Y. Senate Rules Committee on July 2, 1982. The bill
never emerged from committee, nor was it reintroduced in the
legislature. While this particularproposal may have been set
aside, the issues it concerns have not disappeared. We have
elected to include this articlefor its general examination of the.
political and economic costs of revenue financing as opposed to
general obligation financing.

Due to increased energy and transportation costs and
water shortages in the Southwest, industries are reexamining the advantages of remaining or expanding in the
northeastern United States. This places the City of Buffalo,
with Lake Erie sitting in its lap, in a very advantageous
position; yet, the city's water system is antiquated, a victim of age and neglect. An important question facing Western New York is whether Buffalo can utilize its great water
asset, particularly in light of estimates which place the price
of modernizing the city's water system in the $200 million
to $500 million range.
While water resources are plentiful in Western New
York, the people and industries which have located in the
Sun Belt are being confronted with one immutable fact: that
area does not have any water resources. Water is pumped
in from a number of sources, primarily ground aquifers such
as the Ogallala Aquifer, which stretches from western
Texas to northern Nebraska. But each day, twenty-one billion more gallons flow out than seep into these ground
sources. Some experts say that the Sun Belt's current reliance upon such sources is one of "buying time"; severe
water depletion, if not outright exhaustion in many inMark D. Rasch is a J.D., 1983, State University of New York
at Buffalo.
Frank Butterini is aJ.D., 1983, State University of New York

at Buffalo.

stances, is predicted within thirty to fifty years.
The New York State Water Finance Authority has
been proposed, by members of the state legislature, as a
mechanism for allowing municipalities to exceed constitutionally imposed debt limits. This would permit localities to
utilize the proceeds of revenue bonds to modernize their
inadequate water and sewer systems.
While the proposal attempts to deal with pressing local
and statewide needs, it is ill-advised. It could easily have
the effect of placing localities such as Buffalo in an economic
straitjacket which would hinder, rather than promote,
economic development. This article examines both the history of water and sewer systems administration and the
Water Finance Authority proposal with its implications. It
concludes with suggestions for better methods of financing
capital projects.

I. THE FISCAL HISTORY OF LOCAL-CONTROLLER
WATER SYSTEMS
The City of Buffalo's water distribution system is antiquated, designed in the nineteenth century with more than
half of its eight hundred miles of water mains built before
1930. The city loses about 10 percent of the one hundred
million or more gallons it pumps daily due to the age and
disrepair of the water supply infrastructure. The pumps,
transmission lines, and management systems need upgrading. Estimates regarding the cost of modernizing the system
range from $200 million to $500 million-figures that dwarf
anything that has been done in the city before. (See, The
Report of Government Finance Associates, Inc., Princeton,
New Jersey, April 17, 1980.)
When Buffalo's water system was installed during the
early decades of this century, user fees were implemented
to recoup the cost of construction and operation. Use taxes
or fees are levied on property owners in relation to the actual service or benefit received. As with other cities in the
state, once the basic water system was in place, little effort
was expended by the municipality to provide funds for capiI
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tal rehabilitation. The revenues from the water projects
were placed into general coffers. At the outset, most water
projects and user fees were overvalued in light of the long,
actual useful life of these projects. Because water finance
fees represented a steady stream of revenue to the city,
there was strong incentive for the municipality to use these
funds (to the extent that they were not needed for the dayto-day operation of the water department) to subsidize
other municipal projects for public health and for police and
fire protection. The arrangement worked while the water
projects were running at a profit.
Because of the political difficulty with raising user fees
(perceived as taxes by residents), the disparity between
costs of providing services and the fees charged narrowed.
Profits disappeared as the systems began operating at a
loss. The municipality was then faced with the choice of
raising fees, subsidizing operations and construction with
other municipal revenues, or deferring, delaying, or elimina,
ting entirely capital improvements. Politicians-out of a desire to meet current needs of police and health protection
and because of the invisible nature of these capital improvements-preferred the latter course of action. As a result,
water systems, which should have been on an eighty-year
maintenance cycle, have instead been maintained as if they
have a useful life cycle of three hundred to four hundred
years. Debilitation has set in, threatening the distribution
of the area's water resources. It is to correct such situations
statewide that the Water Finance Authority was proposed.
Adding to the neglect of municipal water systems has
been the lack of federal financial assistance. While the federal government has paid more than 50 percent of the cost
of sewage treatment and disposal, it has contributed only 4
percent to the cost of water supply, with the City of Buffalo itself paying the balance. One major solution, therefore,
to the current deterioration of the water system would be
for the federal government to make water supply a priority.

II. THE WATER FINANCE AUTHORITY CONCEPT
The primary purpose of the proposal is to permit municipalities of the state, through the Public Authority, to float
revenue bonds to pay for the repair, construction, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of water and sewage treatment
facilities. Under the plan, the state legislature would create
the New York State Water Finance Authority. In the
statement of the bill's purpose, the drafters declared that:

Unprecedented high interest rates and in,
creased capital costs have caused difficulty for a
number of municipalities in selling a sufficient
amount of general obligation securities to meet
all the capital requirements related to needed
construction or reconstruction of and additions
to their water and sewerage systems.
[A. 8035-B, March 31, 1981, Section 1Findings and Declaration of Purpose)
Aid to a municipality would be accomplished by the
Authority itself assuming direct financial liability for con,
struction costs. Because of this, the Authority is a very at,
tractive concept to financially strained municipalities, since
they are limited in their ability to contract indebtedness.
For example, the City of Buffalo may only contract debt up
to 9 percent of the average full value of its taxable real
estate-that is, about $27 million (N.Y.S. Constitution, Ar,
ticle VIII, Section 5). Most cities are near their debt limit.
The use of public authorities and revenue bonds has been a
method utilized in the past to circumvent constitutionally
imposed debt limits.
Another constraint on local governments is the fact
that they are constitutionally prohibited from floating
revenue bonds. Any municipal debt must be secured by the
full faith and credit of the debtor. It is to achieve the flexi,
bility of revenue bonds that the public authority was
created in 1923.
A public authority is a public benefit corporation legally
separate from a state or municipality. It may have the
power to contract indebtedness and charge user fees. It
may be created only by a special law of the state legislature;
otherwise, localities could simply create a public authority
when they need cash, without regard to their own debt
capacity (N.Y.S. Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3).
Municipalities had the power to create their own public
authorities until 1938, when a New York State constitu,
tional convention attempted to curb local abuses of this
mechanism. As a consequence of the 1938 constitutional
reforms, the public authority system became a mandate of
fiscal integrity through the exercise of state control over
local expenditures for local services.
The public authority does have some attractive ele,
ments. It can uniquely provide a municipal service without
burdening the state or municipal body with any direct financial obligations. A municipality, with state consent, may
delegate a heretofore municipal function (such as public
housing or transportation) to a public authority. Municipal
governments may also influence the choice of the authori-
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ty's officers, delegate direct financial responsibility to the
authority, and still receive the benefits of the authority's
administered services. A municipality may even go so far as
to hold title to the property which is financed by the
authority. (See, Comereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248,
1955.)

Ill. THE WATER FINANCE AUTHORITY
PROPOSAL
Under the Water Authority proposal (A. 8035-A, B,
March 1981), the Authority may assist the municipality in
one of three ways.
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A. The Loan-Agreement Method
The Loan-Agreement Method of the bill (section 1045-e)
would permit a municipality to float general obligation
bonds-that is, bonds which are secured by the full faith
and credit of the municipality. The municipality would sell
these bonds directly to the Authority, receiving quick cash
in return. The Authority would, in turn, float its own
revenue bonds, using both the municipal bonds and state
aid intercept as collateral. The state aid intercept acts as a
lien that the Authority would have against state aid which
is due the municipality.' The municipality then would use
the monies received from the Authority to construct the
water works. Finally, the locality may earmark user fees
generated from the project as payment on the loan received
from the Authority. This plan is very attractive to those

_
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... water systems which should
have been on an eighty year
maintenance cycle have instead
been maintained as if they have a
useful life of three hundred to four
hundred years.
financially hard-hit municipalities which may have difficulty selling their bonds on the open market.

B. The Lease-Purchase Agreement
A second method of financing would allow the Authority
to enter into a lease-purchase agreement with the municipality (section 1045-0. The Authority would float revenue
bonds and construct the water project. The municipality
would act as lessee, but the "rent" paid would go toward
paying off all principal, interest, and operating costs of the
project. In reality, the municipality would be an installment
purchaser of the project, with title vesting in the municipality at the end of the lease. In the event that the municipality defaults in payment, the Authority would continue to
operate the project and collect user fees from the public.
The advantage to the municipality is that the need to
go to the bond market for financing is bypassed. The locality, in effect, is getting and running a water project without
impinging on its borrowing limits.

C. Authority Revenue Bonds
The third method of financing grants the Authority the
power to issue straight revenue bonds-that is, bonds
which are secured to the extent that the project financed
actually produces sufficient revenues to meet the payment
of principal and interest. Bond proceeds would finance and
build the water project itself, which would be administered
by a local water board. The board would be established by
the state legislature with its members appointed by the
municipality. It would set fees and obtain title to the project. The municipality would receive the benefits of the new
water project, yet would not have direct control over it.
The legislative proposal provides that no project would
be funded by the Water Finance Authority under any of

the three options unless it was in compliance with a state,
wide master plan for water and sewage needs (section
1045-f).

IV. PROBLEMS IN THE WATER AUTHORITY
PROPOSAL

The Fallacy of the Municipality Escaping PotentialLiability
The state legislature long ago recognized that water supply
was too important a municipal responsibility to be subject
to constitutionally imposed bonding limits. Such projects
have thus been excluded from the calculation of a munici,
pality's debt load (N.Y.S. Constitution, Article m, Section
5). This affords the municipality the freedom to build and
operate its own water project which may generate revenues
beyond the system's actual cost. These excess revenues
greatly contribute to the municipality's flexibility in struc,
turing its finances. Unfortunately, the municipality remains
directly responsible for the debt obligations of the water
system.
The first two financial schemes mentioned above are in,
tended to allow municipalities to escape direct financial
liability; yet this liability would still exist. In the bill's loan,
agreement provision, the municipality enters into a contrac,
tual agreement with the Water Finance Authority bond
holders by using its general obligation bonds as collateral.
Under the leaseagreement provision, the municipality has
a direct and binding contractual obligation to the Authority
.to rent, and ultimately to purchase, the water system.
Under these two plans, then, the city incurs an obliga,
tion to repay the cost of financing the water project. The
Authority simply acts as a conduit for the funds; its finan,
cial liability is directly and immediately transferrable to the
municipality. It would be folly to assume that the overall
debt position of the municipality would not be evaluated in
light of this liability. (See, Ayer v. Commissioner of Adminis,
tration, 340 Mass. 586, 165 N.E.2d 885, 1961; In re. Ad,
visory Opinion, 400 Mich. 270, 254 N.W.2d 528, 1976.)
In connection with the bill's third financing provision,
which permits the Authority to actually assume the cost
and responsibility of administering the project, it cannot be
forgotten that a municipality has an obligation to provide
for the health and sanitary needs of its constituents (N.Y.
Public Health Law, Article 11; N.Y. Environmental Con,
servation Law, Article 15). Should a water authority de,
fault, the municipality would likely be forced to pick up the
cost of completion and operation. Thus, the Water Finance
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Authority proposal does not absolve a municipality of
financial liability.

Increased User Fees
A pivotal issue in the water finance authority concept is
the use of revenue bonds. One advantage of these bonds is
that they require the financed project to be self-supporting;
that is, the user fees must be sufficient to pay off the project's bond obligations. By that very fact then, revenue
bonds avoid default by the public authority.2 Their use requires that revenue from the project be sufficient to cover
the costs of construction, operation, and principal and interest payments. Because water projects are currently undervalued, this type of financing would cause a dramatic and
sudden increase in water fees. The ramifications of this increase could be severe and costly.
Since water user fees are considered a form of regressive taxation, and because of the relatively inelastic demand for water, poorer families would ultimately pay a
greater percentage of income in fees compared with higherincome households. Additionally, these increased fees
could have a potentially tremendous adverse impact on the
numerous industries of the state, particularly in the chemical, paper and lumbering, beverage processing, and steel
production industries, which use large quantities of water.
The historic undervaluation of water projects has acted as
an indirect subsidy to industries in the state which are the
largest water users. The increase in water fees will no
doubt inhibit the inclination of new or existent industries to
locate within the state.

The Increased Cost of Revenue Bond Financing
Revenue bonds do not have the broad financial backing of
general obligation bonds (full faith and credit of issuing
municipality) but are repaid only by the revenue produced
by the particular projects that they finance. Because of this,
they represent a higher risk investment by bond holders.
As a result, revenue bonds generally carry an interest rate
which is one-half to one percentage point higher than that
of general obligation bonds. Thus, a program financed by
revenue bonds would result in even higher user fees to
cover the cost of higher interest rates. The impact upon the
poor and existent industries, noted above, would be exacerbated by this method of financing.
At the same time, a bond issue which is floated by the
Authority, by its very nature, decreases the amount of

The historic undervaluation of

water projects has acted as an
indirect subsidy to the industries of
the state....
money in the credit market available to the municipality.
This in turn increases the interest rate which the municipality owes on its bond to investors. As a result of this
fiscal interplay, the municipality has a decreased ability to
provide for other needed services.

The Lack of Local Control
The current economic stagnation requires fiscal flexibility
on the part of municipalities. The indirect subsidization of
industries, which has resulted from the undervaluation of
water fees, would be removed by the use of revenue bonds.
This traditional subsidy would disappear at a time when
the state and local governments are desperately trying to
lure new industry. In effect, a municipality which chooses
or is forced to use the Water Finance Authority as a mechanism for modernizing its water facilities would lose the
power to decide whether to continue the subsidy. Instead
of this decision being reached at the political level, it is
automatically invoked as part of the project's financing
scheme.
This result illuminates the reality that public authorities represent an assault on the traditional democratic notions of public accountability and responsibility. While
executive departments are directly responsible to the
governor and indirectly to the legislature in terms of
funding, public authorities tend to be insulated and inflexible. They are able to incur debt and thereby indirectly force
the state to incur this debt, free of the requirement that it
submit the proposal to a public referendum. Not only does
this result in substantial financial imperatives placed upon
the municipality, but it does so independent of local power
to control these consequences. Eventually, the Authority's
independence may encroach upon the locality's constitutional protection from state interference (N.Y.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2[b][21).
Additionally, financing by the State Water Authority
would only be permitted if the locality agreed to have its
water project run in accordance with a state master plan.
Yet, the needs of localities with respect to water projects
I
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vary widely in different areas of the state. The primary
problem in New York City is one of water supply; on Long
Island, it is one of water quality; in Buffalo, one of water
distribution. Local governments, aware of their own needs
and priorities and responsibility to the electorate, should be
given primary control over these projects.
It is axiomatic to recognize that proximity increases
accountability by increasing access. In the case of a public
authority in which access is limited, accountability is also
limited; but authorities tend to be cumbersome and unresponsive for other reasons. The legislature is not permitted
to direct the accounts of a public authority, a task left solely
to the state comptroller (Pattersonv. Carey, 395 N.Y.S. 2d
411). Consequently, a public authority, which is the creature of the state legislature, can tie the legislature's hands.
Through the use of bond covenants (contractual obligations
between the public authority and its creditors), the authority can oblige itself to perform some function (for example,
charging a particular fee), which the legislature is constitutionally unable to rescind. As a result, the public authority
can, in some cases, exert more control over the public than
even the elected representatives. Added to this is the fact
that the proposed water authority is specifically exempted
from the requirements of competitive bidding (Section

1045-f[3]).
Inefficiency Created by a State Water Authority
Public Authorities can also tend to create fragmented delivery of services. Many authorities are given responsibility
for various aspects of the same operation (financing, construction, management). This control may also be exerted
by an executive or local department. The result is often
waste and overlap. The proposed Water Finance Authority would not dismantle any existing agencies or departments of water or sewer facilities.
New York State is currently composed of a crazy quilt
of local water and sewer departments. In Erie County, for
instance, the City of Buffalo has its own water and sewer
system, yet the Erie County Water Authority, a publicbenefit corporation, has its own facilities and sells its water
to numerous localities in the county. Some of these municipalities buy water from the Authority but administer their
own systems; in some instances, the County Authority
sells directly to residents. Other municipalities, like the
City of Buffalo, have both constructed and operated their
own systems. So, rather than simplifying the system, the
Water Authority concept would add yet another layer to
an already complicated bureaucracy.

I

SOME PROPOSALS
There are ways in which municipalities can take advantage
of revenue bonding without sacrificing either local control
or paying a premium interest rate.
Local governments are not prohibited from floating
what can be termed revenuebacked general obligationbonds.
In this way, the municipality could float a general obligation
bond, backed by the full faith and credit of the municipality,
and pledge that the bond will be used to construct a partic,
ular project, the revenues from which will be sufficient to
pay back the principal and interest of the bonds. Should
municipal default occur, the holders of these bonds would
carry a lower interest rate. To the extent that they are self,
amortizing, they would have little, if any, effect on the
municipality's credit rating.
If the state wishes to establish a unified plan for water
projects, the legislature can mandate state approval of all
water projects as they arise individually. Such a proposal
would be more direct, more effective, and less costly than
the proposal requiring adherence to a statewide master plan
under the aegis of the Water Finance Authority.
If the state wants to increase the acceptance of municipal bonds on the market, it can require that all municipali,
ties adopt the state comptroller's accounting system. This
would bring an end to the fraud and chicanery which has
characterized the municipal budgeting process in New York
State for many years.
Another mechanism exists which allows financially insecure local governments to enter the credit municipal bond
market. Both the Municipal Bond Insurance Association
and the American Bond Assurance Company currently insure municipal bonds. This type of insurance has been suc,
cessfully used for Nassau County Sewer Bonds and by the
State of Washington to lower overall interest rates.
Finally, the real solution to the &.ate's capital improve'
ment needs is for the federal government to finance a
greater share of the burden than it presently does. Without
the infusion of new funds, there can be no guarantee that
the capital requirements of the older northeastern cities will
be met. This is, after all, a problem of national dimension.
FOOTNOTES
1. However, in Wein v. City of New York(, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550, the
Court of Appeals held that the state-aid concept was not a true lien,
because it required the nondiscretionary assistance of the state comptroller
to enforce it.
2. An examination of the recent Washington State Power System
default indicates that this may no longer be true.
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